Ultra at Sea: How Breaking the Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval...

Features

• Cover Type: Paperback
• Published by: Quill August 1990
• Written in: English
• ISBN 10 Number: 0688094228
• ISBN 13 Number: 978-0688094225
• Book Dimensions: 9.2 x 6 x 0.8 inches
• Weighs: 12 ounces

Reader Reviews
THe author has written many works on naval operations and life at sea from the time of Raleigh to the modern day. In addition he has written almost as much fiction. This book focuses on the use of the ULTRA intercepts in winning the sea campaigns against the Kriegsmarine in WW II. There is much published, good, bad, and otherwise on the code breakers and activities of the US and Britain in WW II, there is little on how the intel was actually used. Codebreaking and decryption in wartime is simply an intellectual game unless the results are combined with all available intelligence and gotten to the field forces in good time for use in combat operations. And the same is applicable to peacetime but there is often the luxury of time to ponder. Not so, the cat must pounce or the prey will flee. Thus, this book is quite interesting as it focuses not on the war effort as a whole. A compartively slender tome it covers the subject and analyzes the use and then the author concludes. Using SIGINT is always difficult because, first, the special security needed to keep the secret. This was not so much a problem with naval ops because the decrypts went to the Admiralty by courier and landlines. Field headquarters ground and air staff personnel were not all indoctrinated and those who were, were forbidden to go in harm's way for fear of capture and compromise. An indoctrinated USAAF officer went on a mission over Germany against orders, but managed to conceal his knowledge from his captors. Second difficulty is the need to make cover for use so that the blame for the defeat can be placed on any source other than SIGINT. Thus, aircraft were often sent out to spoof the convoys from Italy to North Africa and deliberate deception leaks were made to point the finger at actual spies in the ports of departure. Deserves a place on the shelf of every student of operational use of intelligence.