Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire...

Features

• Cover Type: Hard Cover with 192 pages
• Published by: Routledge
• Edition: 1st Edition April 30, 1999
• Written in: English
• ISBN 10 Number: 0714649309
• ISBN 13 Number: 978-0714649306
• Book Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 1 inches
• Weighs: 1 pounds

Product Review
'These case studies are masterful and have the immediacy of contemporary history. Dr Lehmanns special strength is in her ability to digest and to simplify extremely complex operations. Her highly compressed and densely packed summaries of these served with UNTAG, has a narrative power not common in scholarly works this is an great book, an essential reading for those interested in and concerned with modern peace operations.' - Lieutenant Colonel James V. Arbuckle

'This is an important and brave book. It is important because it is fresh, analytical and identifies the grave shortcomings in the handling of information and the media by the UN in conflicts and emergencies. It is brave because it is written by an insider who knows the deficiencies and wants organisations like the UN to learn the lessons. Peacekeeping and Public Information neatly treads a fine line. It is restrained when perhaps direct accusations could be levelled. But that restraint is its value, because Ingrid Lehmann is identifying shortcomings, not apportioning blame. The failings of procedures - and the need to rebuild them - matter more than the failures of personalities, which undoubtedly there have been in UN Operations. Not just the UN can learn from this book. Also humanitarian organisations, the media, the military, diplomats - and most significantly the corporate world.' - Nik Gowing, News Anchor and Analyst on Information in Conflict and Emergencies

'I would make my choice available to all foreign news editors and all students of journalism [it] proves how important an understanding of peace operations mounted by the UN is.' - Linda Melvern, Glasgow Herald (Books of the Year)

Product Description
The soldiers of the Red Army identified the Reichstag as the victor's prize to be taken in Berlin. Stalin had promised Berlin to Marshal Zhukov, but the latter's blundering in the preliminary breakthrough battle threw his timetable and forced a complete change of plan for reducing the city. Stalin used the opportunity to chasten his subordinates by allowing Marshal Koniev, Zhukov's rival, to introduce one of his tank armies into the competition unknown to Zhukov. Abandoning the rest of his army group, Koniev personally directed this army in the hope of grabbing the prize.




Meanwhile, the Germans improvised a defence with inadequate resources. The remains of General Weidling's 56th Panzer Corps were reluctantly dragged into the city in a futile attempt to prolong the life of the Third Reich, whose leaders squabbled and schemed in their underground shelters, a world apart from the reality outside, where their subjects suffered and died unheeded. Ten days later, after the successive suicides of Hitler and Goebbels, the survivors picked between breakout and surrender.




This account of the battle lays the many myths created by Soviet propaganda after the event and details what exactly happened as the Red Army and the Allies raced to be the first to the Reichstag.

Reader Reviews
This review is from: Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire (Cass Series on Peacekeeping, 5) (Paperback) Edit of twenty Dec 07 to add links. This book is a first class piece of work, a seminal work with ideas not readily available elsewhere. Building on her earlier monograph about the UN experience in Haiti with respect to public information--a monograph that is included in this book as a chapter--the author has gone on to look at several other UN operations. The author's conclusions are consistent with but expand upon her findings from the Haiti mission. 1) Information Operations must be in the mandate and must be a major focus of effort from day one. Although the author has a limited focus, on information as public affairs or public diplomacy, her points are all relevant to the larger appreciation of Information Operations as inclusive of decision-support and tactical-operational Peacekeeping Intelligence, as well as the larger concept of Information Peacekeeping. 2) Secretary General's Special Representative (SGSR), the military force commander, and the police force commander must agree on unified public information operations and an integrated staff with a single coherent message. 3) Standing staffs and normal tour lengths are essential to success. The somewhat common practice of Member states rotating people in and out in 30-90 day cycles is simply not professional and ultimately undermines the mission. 4) Considerable numbers of language-qualified translators and interpreters are required. 5) In illiterate societies (such as Haiti), radio and music rule. Strong radio programs can be extremely helpful, but only if hundreds of thousands of portable radios, and the batteries to power them, are given out. When confronting violence on the street, or seeking to break up gathering mobs, music has extraordinary power to diffuse anger. While the author is most diplomatic in addressing the facts, it is clear from this book that the Department of Public Information (DPI) at the UN has still not matured, and is still a major obstacle to the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations on creating strategic, operational, and tactical decision support or intelligence capabilities for all UN operations. In my personal view, the next head of the DPI needs to be given one simple order: "turn DPI into a global grid for information collection and information sharing, or find a new job." DPI today is 77 one-way streets, and generally immature one-way streets with potholes. DPI has no understanding of peacekeeping intelligence, information peacekeeping, information metrics, or information as a substitute for money and guns. In the context of what the Brahimi Report seeks to accomplish--all of it good and urgently needed--DPI appears to be a huge cancer within the UN, one that must be operated on before the larger UN information environment can become effective. The author adds to the literature in articulating six principles for outward communications of message in a peacekeeping operation; in brief, 1) public perceptions are a strategic factor; 2) international and local public opinion impact on the political influence that impacts on tactical effectiveness; 3) external information campaign must be a strategic focus from day one; 4) education campaigns, e.g. on the rule of law, are vital aspects of peacekeeping campaigns; 5) culturally-sensitive messaging is a must; and 6) transparency of policy and objectives is a pre-condition for message success. The notes and references in this book are quite professional. One wonders if the Brazilians and the Americans are reading the DPKO Mid and Post Mission Assessment Reports from Haiti in 1996, or simply making the same mistakes anew. See also: Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future Information Operations: All Information, All Languages, All the Time The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political--Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption THE SMART NATION ACT: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest