Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II |
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You Are Here: Home > History Books > Gallic Wars > Item 233
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Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II
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by DAVID KAHN
Sales Rank: 461616
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List Price: $27.00
$21.60
At Amazon
on 8-7-2008.
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Features
Cover Type: Paperback with 720 pages
Published by: Da Capo Press June 2000
Written in: English
ISBN 10 Number: 0306809494
ISBN 13 Number: 978-0306809491
Book Dimensions:
8.8 x 5.8 x 1.9 inches
Weighs: 2.3 pounds
New York Times Book Review
"A serious book, clearly: handcrafted, meant to last."
Product Description
A German patrol wiggles through Russian lines to return with details of Soviet defenses. An expert Luftwaffe interrogator teases secret information from downed Allied airmen. Two spies steal ashore in Maine and make their way into New York City. Filled with episodes of intrigue and adventure, Hitler's Spies reveals the workings of German intelligence—the famed Abwehr, the dreaded SD, the codebreakers, the spies, and the intelligence gatherers of the Foreign Office—and explains its failure to best the Allies. Draws on original documents and extensive interviews.
Reader Reviews
In 1978, David Kahn attempted to write the first comprehensive history of German military intelligence in the Second World War. There results are mixed. The author is to be applauded for shedding considerable new light on this heretofore-neglected subject. However, this is an anecdote-driven study, not a comprehensive history. To be sure, Kahn covers virtually every aspect of intelligence collection and analysis in the Third Reich. In itself, the scope of this work is impressive and the reader quickly gains an appreciation for the amount of research required to produce this result. Organizationally, the book is divided into three main sections. After a sixty-page prologue that outlines the origins of German military intelligence, the first section details all the various collection agencies in the next 300 pages. Everything from agents, to radio intercept units, Luftwaffe interrogators, aerial and tactical reconnaissance is covered, each in its own chapter. The second section, of 69 pages, covers the various organizations that analyzed intelligence in the Third Reich. The final section, 75 pages long, analyzes three case studies (Operations Barbarossa, Torch and Overlord) where German intelligence failed. A 20-page conclusion outlines Kahn's theories on why German intelligence failed in its mission. There are also many useful extras, including excellent photos, original documents and a 1943 intelligence organization chart. While most sections are usually interesting to read, the anecdote-driven nature of this work is a severe detractor. The chapters bounce around chronologically, with Kahn typically providing an anecdote from the 1940 French campaign, then the Russian Front and then one from the Normandy campaign. This is a potentially misleading method for painting the portrait of an entire organization, by attempting to draw general conclusions from a few specific examples. Kahn consistently paints a picture of a fumbling, inept German intelligence effort, while ignoring similar Allied and Soviet intelligence failures in 1940-1942. Kahn's conclusions are very contentious. While grudgingly admitting that Germany was able to score some tactical intelligence successes that aided the early blitzkriegs, he blames the failure of strategic intelligence on five factors. Somehow, Kahn sees "unjustified arrogance" as a peculiarly German trait that caused the Wehrmacht to slight intelligence. Kahn's pro-British bias is striking; did not British General Browning ignore repeated indications that German armor was deployed near Arnhem in 1944? Kahn makes a great deal of one episode in 1945 where a dejected Hitler sweeps aside aerial photos indicating the coming Soviet offensive against Berlin, but Browning did virtually the same thing when shown low-level photos of SS panzers near Arnhem. The British Army also had a long history of arrogance leading to disaster at places ranging from Yorktown, Isandhlwana, Gallipoli, the Somme to Arnhem. A second poorly argued factor is the supposed greater need for intelligence on the defense. Knowledge of the terrain, weather and enemy dispositions is equally important on the offense or defense. While Kahn is correct in asserting that Germany's sudden entry into aggressive war did not give the Abwehr sufficient time to establish spy networks in England, the rest of this argument is founded on half-digested readings of Clausewitz. A third argument, that Nazi anti-Semitism "deprived German intelligence of many brains" is downright silly. Kahn infers that German intelligence, particularly code-breaking, would have been enhanced if Jewish mathematicians had not been purged. This ignores the fact that Allied breakthroughs were made by non-Jews like Turing and exaggerates the impact of a minority to alter the character of a dictatorship. The Third Reich had plenty of gifted individuals, many of whom gave their all for the regime. It didn't matter. Two final contributing factors are more pertinent. There is no doubt that the authority structure of the Fuehrer state inhibited the proper analysis of information as Kahn asserts. Hitler was a megalomaniac who increasingly rejected information that contradicted his view of "reality". However, the larger assertion that the culture of the German officer corps was endemically hostile to intelligence is weak. It is obvious that Kahn has never worked as an intelligence officer on a military staff, because he puts great stock in German regulations that state that the "intelligence officer works for the operations officer". One hears such attitudes in every army, including the US Army, and it is not due to intrinsic German factors. Furthermore, Kahn's assertion that Allied staffs were more efficient is laughable; the Allies based their staff methods on earlier German staff methods, but lacked the professionalism added by a General Staff cadre. Finally, the assertion that the General Staff officers assigned to intelligence were "second-rate" is oxymoronic, since these officers were the top 5% of the Wehrmacht. Despite thorough research, it is obvious that Kahn does not really understand intelligence operations. Crucial concepts like the intelligence cycle of task-collect-analyze-disseminate are never really discussed, but every phase counts. While Kahn continuously pounds on the Germans for poor efforts in collection and analyzing, he ignores tasking and dissemination. Did the Germans ask the right questions? It appears not, since although their various collectors gathered huge amounts of data about the enemy, there seemed to be no specific priorities. Much of intelligence work is separating the volumes of chaff from the small amount of wheat but the Germans clearly failed in this crucial task. As for dissemination, Kahn does not address this issue, but it would be interesting to know how much the "I've got a secret club" prevented crucial information from reaching the troops in a timely manner. This book should be on every professional intelligence officer's shelf, but taken with a grain of salt. Broad generalizations about ethnic tendencies or factors intrinsic only to one army should be viewed critically.
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Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II
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Updated on 8-7-2008.
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