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The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I |
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You Are Here: Home > History Books > Gallic Wars > Item 276
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The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I
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by John Mosier
Sales Rank: 599401
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List Price: $14.95
$10.17
At Amazon
on 9-16-2008.
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Features
Cover Type: Paperback with 400 pages
Published by: Harper Perennial July 30, 2002
Written in: English
ISBN 10 Number: 0060084332
ISBN 13 Number: 978-0060084332
Book Dimensions:
7.9 x 5.3 x 1.1 inches
Weighs: 11.2 ounces
Reader Reviews
The Myth of the Great War is a fatally flawed revisionist account of WW1 that asserts that all previous accounts were distorted by Allied propaganda, faulty historiography, bias and selective use of facts. Mosier, an English professor whose writing style seems to demonstrate that higher education in Louisiana means successfully stringing together sentence fragments, asserts that the Germans won all the battles due to their immense superiority in artillery and tactical skill, but that the Americans reversed the tide of inevitable German victory. The author then employs German propaganda, faulty historiography, bias and selective use of facts to demonstrate that everyone who wrote about the war prior to him was either a fool or a liar. The level of intellectual dishonesty and objectivity that Mosier employs to validate and sensationalize his counter-intuitive hypothesis is astounding. Right up front, readers with background in the First World War will begin to suspect Mosier's integrity by his flagrant and frequent use of exaggerations and deliberate concealment of relevant facts. Mosier asserts Germany's technological edge, in that "the German army entered the war using weapons that the British and the French simply didn't possess (hand grenades, mortars, motorized super-heavy artillery).." but he fails to mention that the Germans had only fifty small minenwerfer or that the British engineers had hand grenades just like the German pioneers. Nor does he mention that the British Stokes mortar introduced in August 1915 was far superior to German models and became the standard design up to the current day. Indeed, Mosier is constantly harping on German technological adaptiveness, but fails to mention that the Allies pressed steel helmets into service a year before the Germans, or the rapid introduction of gas masks to counter the new poison gas. Furthermore, Germany's failure to seriously pursue tank development is dismissed by Mosier as irrelevant since tanks were still mechanically unreliable. Mosier ignores Joffre's artillery program of 1915 that quickly began to rectify Allied deficiencies in that arm or the frequent use of super-heavy railroad guns. Mosier is also overly fond of exaggerated terms like "massacre," "destroyed, " "wiped out," or "annihilated" when referring to Allied losses. The author's repeated reference to Allied "kamikaze attacks" is gratuitously stupid. Distortions are rampant in this account. Mosier asserts that, "Germany won the military struggle against its adversaries because Germany used its resources more intelligently." Really? What about the logistic infeasibility of the Schlieffen Plan, the huge waste of steel on a High Seas Fleet that spent most of the war at anchor and then mutinied, expensive Zeppelins and an indecisive attrition offensive at Verdun instead of finishing off Russia in 1916? Mosier is quick to assert German tactical success at the Marne in 1914, St Mihiel in 1914 and Verdun in 1916 - yet why did they always stop or withdraw at the hour of victory if Allied efforts were so ineffective? Indeed, Mosier never asks why German tactical success failed to produce a strategic success in any of their offensives in 1914-1916. The author also misunderstands the role of artillery in trench warfare; heavy artillery was only effective in defeating attacks in conjunction with barbed wire and inter-locking machine gun posts. Without an obstacle belt covered by machine gun fire, the German artillery would not have stopped Allied infantry attacks. The only decent part of this account is the discussion of the post-Marne German attacks in Argonne and St Mihiel, which are usually ignored in other accounts. Mosier's account of the little-known 1915 struggle for the Buttes - the Vauquois and Les Éparges - is interesting but ignores better Allied efforts at Neuve Chapelle and Vimy Ridge in the same period. Furthermore, the author delights in detailing French losses but fails to mention "der Kindermord" (massacre of the Innocents) of German reservists at Ypres in late 1914. Certainly the most blatant example of the author's dishonest approach is his use of the Tavannes railroad tunnel accidental explosion on 4 September 1916 that killed about 500-600 French troops to assert that, "this incident...suggests a lack of order in the French Army....in a well-organized and properly run army [i.e. the German Army] such things as the Tavannes tunnel disaster don't happen." It is inconceivable that an author who spent so much time walking around Verdun would be unaware of the German accidental explosion at Fort Douamont on 8 May 1916 that killed 600 troops. Why was the French accident an indictment of their army, but not the German accident? When it comes to the British, Mosier's narrative continually eschews objectivity. Mosier asserts that, "in the United Kingdom, with its traditions of a volunteer army, there had never been any pressure forcing the military to train efficiently..." What about the Haldane Commission of 1907 that affected major changes due to lessons learned in the Boer War? Mosier fixates on German General von Mudra as the originator of new combined arms tactics (ignoring Bruchmuller's artillery innovations) but completely ignores the "Monash Method" on the Allied side. The author dismisses Allied successes: "the capture of Vimy Ridge was an impressive accomplishment, but the army commanders were unable to follow it up properly." Mosier also asserts that, "the United States was a cobelligerent long before it declared war," but fails to mention the trips of the German blockade running submarine Deutschland to the USA in 1916 just months before American entry into war. Would a cobelligerent give Germany vital war material? The author also has a annoying tendency for double-talk. Mosier asserts that, "Belleau Wood was a crucial engagement.." but on the next page, "Belleau Wood was an insignificant engagement.." What was it? At first, Mosier asserts that American general Pershing, "had the background for the task, which made him unique among the senior commanders of the war" and that Pershing was a general "when Petain, Foch and Haig .. were all still colonels." Actually, Haig was a major general in 1905 when Pershing was still a captain.
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The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I
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