Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Clarendon Library of Logic and...

Features

• Cover Type: Hard Cover with 312 pages
• Published by: Oxford University Press, USA January 25, 1996
• Written in: English
• ISBN 10 Number: 0198235747
• ISBN 13 Number: 978-0198235743
• Book Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.8 x 1.1 inches
• Weighs: 1.2 pounds

Product Review

"Stein has done a great service in bringing together all of the important arguments in the human rationality debate and providing a measured critical assessment of them.This will be an important book and is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of mind, and cognitive and evolutionary psychologists."--Choice


Product Description
In this book, Edward Stein offers a clear critical account of the debate about rationality in philosophy and cognitive science. He discusses concepts of rationality--the pictures of rationality on which the debate centers--and assesses the empirical evidence used to argue that humans are irrational. He concludes that the question of human rationality must be answered not conceptually but empirically, using the full resources of an advanced cognitive science. Furthermore, he extends this conclusion to argue that empirical considerations are also relevant to the theory of knowledge--in other words, that epistemology should be naturalized.

Reader Reviews
This review is from: Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) (Paperback) Do humans have the normative principles of reasoning in their reasoning competence? A positive answer was assumed by most scientists, economists, and philosophers (pace Freud, Nietzsche et al.), until the stunning variety of experiments by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and their coworkers began to appear in the early 1970's. Their results convinced large numbers of psychologists that people deviate systematically from the generally accepted principles of reasoning. Many, however, disagreed with this interpretation, arguing that the logical and mathematical mistakes people routinely make in the laboratory are due to misunderstanding (e.g., logical connectives mean different things in formal logic and everyday discourse) or performance error (the problems are very hard, and few could solve them without a course or two in probability theory), among other explanations. Stein's book is a very systematic and detailed review of the arguments, and is well worth reading, both for the uninitiated and those who have closely followed this debate. Stein concludes that the question is an empirical one, and the evidence is not yet all in. I completely agree with Stein's assessment, although I think the evidence is strongly in favor of the rationality thesis: errors in the lab are mostly performance error and misunderstanding. This is not to trivialize the actual findings of Kahneman et al. Far from it. Most humans deviate systematically from the precepts of probability theory, and it is to their disadvantage. People have strange and incorrect ideas about "lucky streaks," they do not understand the Law of Insufficient Reason, they make systematic base-rate errors, and do not apply Bayes law correctly. In my opinion, this makes people less than perfect scientists, but does imply that they are irrational. I do believe that Stein spends an inordinate amount of time evaluating assertions that are plainly false, and not worthy of any extended scrutiny. For instance, he considers the view that even asking the question presumes rationality, since the answer can be correctly obtained only if the evaluators are rational. However, the question is not whether ALL people are irrational, but rather whether the NORMAL PERSON is irrational. The psychologists, mathematicians, and behavioral scientists who pose and study the question are without doubt rational. They have studied the material long enough to become proficient. Similarly, Stein takes seriously the argument that natural selection will favor true beliefs over false beliefs, and since harboring true beliefs is the hallmark of rationality, natural selection will produce rational agents. But, this argument is quite silly. Mosquitos are the product of evolution, but they are not rational in the sense used in posing the question. Humans might be irrational in the same way---they are evolutionarily more complex and evolved, but it could take natural selection another billion years to produce a truly rational species. Moreover, religious beliefs cannot be all true, and some we know are false (e.g., Creationism). So, surely evolved humans can systematically hold false beliefs. These slips aside, we have here a fine book that will hone your understanding of the issues.