An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts

Features

• Cover Type: Paperback with 304 pages
• Published by: Oxford University Press, USA
• Edition: 2nd Edition May 17, 2001
• Written in: English
• ISBN 10 Number: 0199243255
• ISBN 13 Number: 978-0199243259
• Book Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 0.7 inches
• Weighs: 1 pounds

Product Review
() As the title indicates, the book aims at an introductory level. The material is self-contained presuming no prior knowledge by the reader other than elementary microeconomics and calculus. The focus of the book is on the requisite theory, however several applications are developed, and the authors provide frequent references to recent literature. ()

Who will benefit from reading this book? As the authors suggest, the book is certainly suitable as a textbook for a one-semester advanced-undergraduate course. It may also be useful as supplementary reading in a first-year graduate course. especially for students who favor an intuitive and somewhat leisurely presentation which makes extensive use of diagrams. Finally, academics in other fields who want to familiarize themselves with the tools of information economics may want to consult this book as a starting point. All audiences will appreciate the extensive references to the literature as well as the numerous problem sets at the end of the chapters. -- S. REICHEISTEIN, Berkeley, CA, USA (The Journal ofEconomics, vol. 66 (3), 1997) --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Product Review

On the previous edition:"It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics."--Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University


Reader Reviews
This review is from: An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts (Paperback) In less than three hundred pages, the authors are able to introduce Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Signalling in an outstanding accessible way. Given the importance of contract theory in modern Economics, undoubtedely this is the first book to be read. Each chapter is full of examples and graphs that help to understand the mathematics underneath. The reader is supposed to know Kuhn-Tucker theorem, so any advanced undergraduate student in economics should be able to read it. The base model, presented in chapter 2, is used as a benchmark to compare wirh the results obtained from the Moral Hazard model (brilliantly presented in chapter 3), Adverse Selection (chapter 4) and Signalling (chapter 5). Each chapter has very well posed exercises, whose answers are in the end of the book. Furthermore, advanced themes are also discussed in the end of each chapter, giving to the reader a complete overview about theory of information. So, since this theme has been increasingly important in modern economics, and given that this book is very easily readable, I strongly recommend it to any person who wishes to understand theory of contracts and incetives.