Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics (Economics, Cognition, and...

Features

• Cover Type: Paperback with 672 pages
• Published by: University of Michigan Press
• Edition: 2nd Edition edition October 21, 2005
• Written in: English
• ISBN 10 Number: 0472030256
• ISBN 13 Number: 978-0472030255
• Book Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.9 x 1.5 inches
• Weighs: 1.9 pounds

Product Description


This second edition assesses some of the major refinements, extensions, and useful applications that have developed in neoinstitutionalist thought in recent years. More attention is given to the overlap between the New Institutional Economics and developments in economic history and political science. In addition to updated references, new material includes analysis of parallel developments in the field of economic sociology and its attacks on representatives of the NIE as well as an explanation of the institution-as-an-equilibrium-of-game approach.

Already an international best seller, Institutions and Economic Theory is essential reading for economists and students attracted to the NIE approach. Scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. A useful glossary for students is included.

Eirik Furubotn is Honorary Professor of Economics, Co-Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany and Research Fellow, Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University.

Rudolph Richter is Professor Emeritus of Economics and Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany.

Language Notes
Text: English (translation)
Original Language: German --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Reader Reviews
This review is from: Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics (Economics, Cognition, and Society) (Hardcover) Written by two leading authors in the area, this major work explores at length the "new institutional economics." Research in this area has become prominent in the social sciences in the 1980s and 1990s. Addressed largely to academic economists and advanced students, the book covers transaction-cost economics, property-rights analysis, and the theory of contracts. The "new institutional" approach embraced here centers on the key concept of transaction costs. By use of this idea, an attempt is made to explain the nature and role of the organizations and institutions of economic life. The approach is much in the tradition of the work of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase and his well-known and prolific follower Oliver Williamson. The book is organized into ten substantial chapters. After an introduction, the work moves on to a second chapter on the pivotal concept of transaction costs. Two chapters on property rights follow, then chapters on contract theory, markets, firms, and the state. A final chapter usefully considers possible future developments of the new institutional paradigm. The exposition is generally clear and helpful, and the volume is an excellent introduction to the literature of the new institutional economics. Each chapter ends with useful recommendations for further reading. As a comprehensive introduction to a particular type of institutional approach, the book cannot be easily faulted.... Overall, it is a pity that the volume under review did not probe more deeply into the literature on the possible weaknesses of the transaction-cost approach and thereby consider alternative explanations. Nevertheless, the achievements and positive features of the book should not be underestimated. It can be recommended as a comprehensive exploration of the transaction-cost paradigm.